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Abstract
This paper looks into what was a defining phase for Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the 1990s 
the Mediterranean was presented as a source of threat, but also as a need for engagement 
due to proximity and interdependence. The Mediterranean was also seen as an opportunity 
and a responsibility. Through its engagement with the Mediterranean the EU emphasized 
its identity as a transformative actor, linking trade liberalization and political transformation. 
This contributed to a gradual de-politicization and, above all, the technocratization of Euro-
Mediterranean practice. Another constant feature of this period was securitization, particularly 
after the attacks of September 11. The seeds of existing debates on how the EU should deal with 
its Southern Neighbourhood were planted in this period. By looking at the institutional, political 
and intellectual debates of the 1990s, we can trace back some of the conceptualizations that 
still shape the European vision of the Mediterranean but also of itself.
Introduction
Investigating the processes that led to a particular conceptualization of the Mediterranean 
in the 1990s may resemble to what one official interviewed described as an “archaeological 
exercise” (Interviewee 1).2 Another confessed that it was nostalgic exercise. “Those good old 
days!” he exclaimed (Interviewee 4). Yet, investigating this period not only help us understand 
the past, but also the present. Many features of today’s EU discourses and practices towards 
the Mediterranean are deeply rooted in those of the 1990s. It was in the 1990s that the discourse 
shifted towards a region-building approach whereby the Mediterranean was presented as the 
optimal perimeter for such an effort, discarding alternative options such as focusing on the 
Maghreb or opening to the countries of the Gulf. It was also in the 1990s that the EU presented 
itself as a transformative power.
This paper aims at deconstructing how the EU defines the Mediterranean, and identifying the 
dichotomies behind this definition (Cebeci and Schumacher 2016). Research for the paper has 
been based on the identification, codification and discourse analysis of 227 documents. This 
sample is made up of 43 documents issued by European institutions, 40 from key Member 
States (Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom), 77 academic articles 
(priority was given to journals having the Mediterranean as a focus but also to authors who 
1	 Pol	Morillas	is	a	research	fellow	at	CIDOB	(Barcelona	Centre	for	International	Affairs)	and	Eduard	Soler	i	Lecha	
is	a	senior	research	fellow	at	CIDOB.	The	authors	would	like	to	thank	Raquel	Pujadas	and	Héctor	Sánchez	Margalef	
for	their	assistance	in	writing	this	paper.
2	 According	to	MEDRESET	ethical	standards	interviews	are	anonymous.	Conversations	were	not	recorded	and,	
thus,	when	quoted,	this	should	be	understood	as	a	re-creation	based	on	the	notes	taken	during	the	interview.
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were especially active during this particular period),3 33 think-tank reports (with a particular 
emphasis on those issued by the EuroMeSCo network due to the cooperative relation 
among this network and between it and the European institutions),4 15 documents produced 
by civil-society organizations5 and 14 books and articles written by intellectuals who were 
commonly regarded as salient in discussions on the Mediterranean. Additionally 12 other 
documents and reports issued by other intergovernmental organizations such as the United 
Nations or NATO have been included in the analysis to verify the extent of coincidence in 
their conceptualization of the Mediterranean. The authors made a conscious choice to include 
documents written in European languages other than English, as the policy and academic 
production on Mediterranean affairs is particularly rich in French, Spanish and Italian.6 This 
was complemented with 8 in-depth interviews with actors who were active in that particular 
period, working for Member States, for European institutions and in civil society organizations.
This collection of sources provides a representative pool of empirical basis to investigate 
whether and through which processes the EU’s discourse on the Mediterranean is constitutive 
of, and legitimizing, its geopolitical, securitized, depoliticizing and technocratic approach to that 
space (Cebeci and Schumacher 2016: 3). To provide an answer, this research has systematically 
followed the debates on the Mediterranean within the political, civil society and epistemic 
communities in Europe between 1990 and 2002. Through this analysis the paper identifies 
which conceptualizations and narratives have become dominant or even hegemonic, in which 
context, and which are the actors or constellations of actors producing and reproducing them. 
By the same token, it also investigates which were the alternative approaches and when they 
were marginalized, silenced and even co-opted.
This paper covers the period from 1990 to 2002. This was a period when the EU fixed a 
geographical understanding of the Mediterranean that has since then been reproduced 
not only through policy instruments but also by the epistemic community dealing with 
Mediterranean affairs and European foreign policy at large. It was also during this period 
that the EU represented itself as a transformative power and, consequently, set up policy 
instruments to achieve this goal. Finally, it was a period in which securitization processes were 
palpable, both at the inception of the Barcelona Process but also when, in the early 2000s, 
migration and terrorism escalated in the agenda.
3	 Five	journals	were	analysed	in	detail:	Mediterranean	Politics,	European	Foreign	Affairs	Review,	The International 
Spectator,	Revista	CIDOB	d’Afers	Internacionals	and	Confluences	Méditerranée.
4	 This	paper	browsed	and	selected	publications	from	six	representative	think-tanks	(Chatham	House,	IFRI,	
CIDOB,	IAI,	SWP	and	EUISS)	and	systematically	analysed	the	papers	produced	in	the	framework	of	EuroMeSCo.	
The	Euro-Mediterranean	Study	Commission	is	the	main	network	of	research	centres	on	politics	and	security	in	the	
Mediterranean	and	was	set	up	in	1996	with	the	goal	of	fostering	research,	information	and	social	relations	among	
its	members	as	well	as	acting	as	a	confidence-building	measure	in	the	framework	of	the	Barcelona	Process.
5	 Particular	attention	was	given	to	those	organizing	or	participating	in	Euro-Mediterranean	Civil	Fora	but	also	
alternative	conferences.
6	 Quotes	from	non-English	sources	have	been	translated	by	the	authors.
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1. The EU’s Construction of the Mediterranean
As explained by Sally Khalifa Isaac and Haidi Esmat Kares (2017), European economic interests 
had triggered previous European policies towards the Mediterranean. Yet from 1990 onwards, 
political and security considerations started to play a greater role, either because new political 
opportunities arose (mainly the launch of the Middle East Peace Process, but also a short-
lived Moroccan-Algerian détente in the early 1990s), new risks became apparent (violence in 
Algeria since 1991 but also the regional effects of the Gulf War) or, not least, because the newly 
founded EU wanted to upgrade its foreign policy profile, searching for a role for itself in a world 
where the Cold War had just ended.
The post-Cold War period was, as put by Federica Bicchi (2007: 129), a period in which “new ideas 
were circulated, new options were considered”. National governments, European institutions, 
diplomats and members of the research community contributed to the consolidation of 
four narratives: the Mediterranean as a threat, as a challenge, as an opportunity and as a 
responsibility.
The Mediterranean was regarded as a threat because of its geographical proximity and because 
of the growing levels of violence, particularly in Algeria. It is revealing to reread the list of 
factors that according to the EU could threaten the stability in this region: “population growth, 
recurrent social crises, large-scale migration, and the growth of religious fundamentalism and 
integralism” (European Council 1992: 21). Thus, we can observe the employment of a security 
speech act when tackling demographic trends and religiosity.
A former European minister explained that following a diplomatic tour to the region he 
realized that it was a “time bomb” and that “Europeans should do something to cushion the 
destabilizing impact of forthcoming crises” (Interviewee 5). Roberto Aliboni (1991: 17) depicted 
the situation as one where Europeans were “frightened by […] the growing immigration from 
these regions”. According to Dorothée Schmid (2003), it was in the 1990s that what had been 
classical economic cooperation became political. According to this French researcher, “in this 
period relations with the Arab and Muslim world were perceived in confrontational terms” 
(Schmid 2003: 5). The Mediterranean worried Europeans. It was considered the epicentre of a 
latent crisis. The Mediterranean, Schmid argues, appeared as a “geographical and conceptual 
framework to elaborate a European response to this threat” (Ibid.).
Federica Bicchi (2007: 144) considers that in this period “the map of European perceptions vis-
à-vis the Mediterranean challenges and threats was redrawn to take in migration (securitised 
at a low level), Islamic fundamentalism (politicised and even securitised at low levels) and 
terrorism”. Intellectuals also elaborated on the concept of the Mediterranean as a threat. Paul 
Balta, for instance, argued that the threat resides “in the fact that the Mediterranean is the 
meeting place and possible confrontation between North and South, the rich and the poor, 
youth and aged population” (Balta 1992: 36).
A complementary stream of thinking emphasized the idea that the Mediterranean was a 
challenge. From that point of view, it was inevitable and even natural to intensify cooperation 
between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. The magic word 
was “interdependence”. The European Commission (1994: 2), for instance, listed environment, 
energy, migration, trade and investment as “areas of Euro-Mediterranean interdependence” 
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and considered that Europeans had “a vital interest in helping Mediterranean countries meet 
the challenges they face”. The then Italian Prime Minister, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, described the 
challenge as follows: “tackling and solving problems which are economic, demographic and 
of coexistence among different civilisations is key for the coming decades. […] We have to be 
aware of the problem, of its dimension, in order to come to concrete proposals” (Mitterrand et 
al. 1993). This idea was accepted by all EU Member States. In Essen, in 1994, they affirmed that 
peace, stability and prosperity in the region were considered amongst the “highest priorities of 
Europe” (European Council 1994b: 26).
A third narrative developed in this period insists on the fact that cooperating in the Mediterranean 
was an economic and political opportunity for the EU. From that point of view, containing a 
threat should not satisfy the EU. Several opportunities were to be explored. The Commission 
(1994: 5), for instance, foresaw that “all Member States would benefit from greater stability and 
prosperity in the region. This would multiply trade and investment opportunities and reinforce 
the base for cooperation in political and economic fields”.
It was also a political opportunity. Investing in a new Mediterranean initiative was a way of 
increasing Europe’s international profile. A European diplomat affirmed that through the 
creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the EU was also trying to contribute to peace 
in the Middle East and, by doing so, to increase its global reputation and be recognized as a 
player – by regional actors but also by the US (Interviewee 2). In her analysis, Federica Bicchi 
(2007: 145) went even further, considering that Europe’s exclusion from the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP) pushed Europeans to establish a “Mediterranean policy as a Middle East 
policy by proxy”. In the case of Spain, which played a leading role in this period, investing in 
the Mediterranean policy of the EU was perceived as an opportunity for “enhancing Spain’s 
international clout” (Hernando de Larramendi 2009) and also as an instrument to soften 
bilateral tensions with some Mediterranean neighbours such as Morocco (Interview 2). This 
is why the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has also been described as a 
process of successful bottom-up Europeanization as individual Member States elevated their 
priorities and concerns to the EU level (Barbé et al. 2007: 42).
This narrative and the dynamics that it implies are indicative of a halfway politicization process. 
Introducing into the Euro-Mediterranean agenda sensitive issues such as Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), terrorism, conflict resolution and particularly anything related to the MEPP 
contributed to the politicization of the agenda. It was far from becoming a purely technical 
cooperation exercise. As one interviewee explained, several governments from Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean countries pushed hard in that direction, particularly regarding WMD 
(Interviewee 1). However, by trying to tackle those issues in the framework of a much larger 
agenda (one that aimed to mitigate an escalation of conflict and to soften initial positions), and 
specifically when the European Commission took the dominant role in the implementation of 
the agenda, a depoliticized and technocratic approach started to gain traction. The Commission 
but also European Affairs departments in some Member States were qualified by one of the 
officials interviewed as pushing for technocratic responses to political challenges (Interviewee 
1). That is, they were acting as depoliticizing agents.
The fourth narrative revolves around the idea that the Mediterranean was Europe’s responsibility. 
To a certain extent this approach is reminiscent of an imperial framing (Doty 1996). From that 
point of view, the EU has no choice but to invest in dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean 
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countries for a number of reasons that include proximity and historical considerations but also 
global trends. This is well reflected in a statement by the European Commission: “at a time of 
globalisation and reinforced regionalism in North America and in Asia, the Community cannot 
renounce the benefits of integrating its southern neighbours under commonly accepted rules” 
(European Commission 1994: 6, emphasis added).
These four narratives framed the political, institutional and intellectual discourse on the 
Mediterranean in discussion of the different initiatives that were on the table. These narratives 
were not perceived as contradictory visions but rather as a coherent catalogue of arguments 
justifying a greater European involvement. In this process, as explained by Federica Bicchi 
(2007), Stephen Calleya (2005), Richard Gillespie (1996, 1997, 1999), Bichara Khader (1997), 
Esther Barbé (1995) and Hayete Chérigui (2000), we can identify several policy-entrepreneurs. 
The Commission together with Southern European countries (Spain and France in particular) 
are seen as playing the most relevant role. Germany was also critical, as it agreed to multiply 
the resources available for this project (Interviewees 1 and 6). Compared to other Northern 
European countries Sweden was also exceptionally committed (Interviewee 1, Johansson-
Nogués 2015).
In several interviews, the role of specific individuals was also mentioned, particularly relating 
to the preparation of the Barcelona Process.7 For them, the Euro-Mediterranean project was 
not only a national and European endeavour but also a personal bet. Many of those individuals 
developed a strong ownership of the Euro-Mediterranean idea and remained active in its 
defence.
2. The EU’s Description of the Self
Internally, the European project of regional integration was going through encouraging times, 
picturing itself as a “role model” for other regional integration experiments. In the 1980s, the 
European Community (EC) enlarged to three southern countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
which had overcome decades of authoritarian regimes partly thanks to the “landing platform” 
that EU membership represented. As part of “democracy’s third wave” (Huntington 1991), the 
effects of future ties with the EC were considered as key drivers for internal political reform and 
economic development. As one of the officials interviewed underlined, the Spanish transition 
to democracy was very present in the mindset of the architects of the Barcelona Process. 
Modernization and attachment to the EC were driving forces of the political transformations 
in Spain, so a similar process vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean partners would prevent 
“political involution” by means of reform in the framework provided by the Euro-Mediterranean 
7	 In	relation	to	1995,	these	individuals	included	Javier	Solana,	Miguel	Ángel	Moratinos,	Antonio	Navarro,	Gabriel	
Busquets,	José	Riera	for	Spain,	Manuel	Marín,	Eberhard	Klein	and	Michael	Webb	for	the	Commission;	Vittorio	Griffo	
for	the	General	Secretariat	of	the	Council;	and	Ambassador	Prague	from	France.	In	the	case	of	Germany,	the	name	
of	Chancellor	Köhl	was	mentioned,	as	he	struck	a	deal	with	Felipe	González	that	was	critical	to	move	the	idea	
forward.	In	the	case	of	Italy,	Gianni	De	Michelis	who	was	minister	from	1999	to	2002	was	mentioned	as	a	critical	
person	during	the	early	1990s	and	particularly	involved	in	the	attempt	to	launch	the	CSCM.	As	for	Mediterranean	
partners,	two	names	were	mentioned:	Amr	Moussa	(then	Egyptian	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs)	and	Amin	Kherbi	(an	
Algerian	senior	official	in	charge	of	the	coordination	of	the	Arab	position).	It	is	worth	mentioning	that	they	are	all	
men.
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Partnership (EMP) (Interviewee 6).
Secondly, and particularly since the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the EU was equipping itself with 
a new set of foreign policy capabilities in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), on which the political aspects of the Barcelona Process were framed (Barbé 1996). 
As Cardwell (2009) has argued, although the EMP was not conceived following any specific 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty or the CFSP, its objective to create a shared area of peace, 
stability and prosperity relates to the institutionalization of a “system of governance”. The aim 
to project the EU’s own system of governance of the CFSP into the EMP puts both experiments 
on a similar footing regarding the EU’s foreign policy agenda. The CFSP, together with the 
longstanding external relations of the EC, would be based on a particular expansion of Europe’s 
model of integration and soft power, particularly towards its immediate neighbourhood, thus 
bringing about change in the domestic landscape of partner countries. While the Mediterranean 
had thus been described as dangerous (see Section 1), this was contrasted by the EU being 
described as a stable and transformative entity. By constructing the “Mediterranean”, “Europe” 
would simultaneously be constructing itself (Pace 2002: 189). The image projected by the EU 
would find in the EMP a testing field for the projection of its “civilian power” (Duchêne 1973).
Externally, the mid-1990s also provided an optimistic framework upon which to build 
the fundamentals of the Barcelona Process. The Process, although never conceived as 
a substitute for the MEPP but rather as a confidence-building generator (Khader 2015: 43), 
would accompany a long-lasting solution and facilitate the reconciliation between Arabs and 
Israelis. Conscious of its role as mediator vis-à-vis the United States, the EU portrayed itself 
as a “region builder and partnership maker” (Attinà 2004: 141), reflecting its internal evolution 
as a successful regional integration project and its normative foreign policy. The reference to 
“normative power” Europe (Manners 2002) is consistent with the attempts of the EU to become 
a security community builder in the Mediterranean (Adler and Crawford 2006), as suggested in 
the conceptual framework provided by Cebeci and Schumacher (2016).
3. Drawing the Boundaries of the Mediterranean
We can trace back to the early 1990s the existence of three different conceptions on who 
is and who is not part of the Mediterranean region and, consequently, who should and who 
should not be invited to join a regional dialogue.
Thus, from the very beginning it was clear that there was not a commonly accepted vision 
on who was part of this Mediterranean space. This paper joins the scholarly debate on the 
European construction of the Mediterranean (Ruel 1991, Henry and Groc 2000, Pace 2002, 
Bilgin 2004, Pace 2006, Adler et al. 2006, Bicchi 2007), adopting a constructivist approach in line 
with MEDRESET’s theoretical framework (Huber and Paciello 2016, Cebeci and Schumacher 
2016). The Mediterranean is a social construction, and as such its meaning as well as the scope 
of the region have evolved over time.
The very fact that different Mediterranean initiatives were on the table also meant that different 
perimeters were considered. This was the case for the 5+5 dialogue, which in 1990 set a rather 
informal and flexible framework for political dialogue and sectorial cooperation between 
8Working Papers
No. 2, April 2017
Southern European countries and the five countries of the Maghreb, that is still operational 
(Coustillière 2012). Italy and Spain flirted with the idea of launching a Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), thus replicating the Helsinki Process in the 
Mediterranean and opening the scope for a broader geographical understanding.8 France and 
Egypt launched a Mediterranean Forum in 1994, bringing together 11 countries in an informal 
inter-governmental dialogue. NATO also launched its Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 and the 
OSCE created the status of “Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation” one year later. The EU as 
a whole also engaged in a process of reviewing and upgrading its policies towards this region. 
It all started with the endorsement by the European Council of the Renovated Mediterranean 
Policy (RMP) in 1990.
As seen in the previous section, some countries were particularly active in fixing the role 
for the EU in this region. That is why it is also important to see how the Mediterranean was 
conceptualized in national debates on foreign policy. Authors like Jean-Robert Henry (2009), 
Hayete Chérigui or Miguel Hernando de Larramendi (2009), Richard Gillespie (1999) or Esther 
Barbé (1991) have referred to the links between national policies towards the Mediterranean 
and different conceptions of the national identity in the process that brought both France and 
Spain to gradually rebrand their traditional “Arab policies” as “Mediterranean”. For instance, by 
adopting this terminology Spaniards attempted to turn the page of Francoist foreign policy. 
For France, this policy was intimately related to its relationship with its colonial past and the 
management of its internal diversity.
One of the first dilemmas that these policy-entrepreneurs but also the EU had to face was 
whether it should have a differentiated approach towards the Maghreb and the Middle East or 
should adopt an integrated Mediterranean vision. For instance, the conclusions of the Lisbon 
European Council in 1992 included two separate declarations on relations between Europe and 
the Maghreb and on the Middle East Peace Process but, even more important, the concept 
of a partnership was exclusively used to refer to the Maghreb, a region described as “the 
Union’s southern frontier” with whom the EU aimed to establish a “framework of cooperation 
in all fields, which should gradually lead to an upgraded partnership between the Union and 
its member States and the Maghreb countries” (European Council 1992: 21). In contrast, the 
conclusions of the Corfu European Council in 1994 stressed “the value for all Mediterranean 
partners of jointly examining political, economic and social problems to which solutions may 
be more effectively sought in the context of regional cooperation” and gave a mandate to 
the Council and the Commission to evaluate “the global policy of the European Union in the 
Mediterranean region and possible initiatives to strengthen this policy in the short and medium 
term, bearing in mind the possibility of convening a conference attended by the European 
Union and its Mediterranean partners”(European Council 1994a: 13).
Opening the geographical scope to the Eastern Mediterranean region was only possible once 
Israel and the Palestinians had signed the Oslo Accords in 1993. After that point, European 
officials considered that launching a Mediterranean initiative involving both Israel and its Arab 
neighbours was not only conceivable but also desirable (Interviewee 3). François Mitterrand, in 
a press conference during a French-Italian summit in 1993, also speculated on that possibility 
8	 This	idea	did	not	materialize	due	to	the	lack	of	support	in	France	and	in	the	US,	but	the	thinking	behind	it	had	a	
long-lasting	impact.
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but argued that “diplomats and politicians should assess whether the whole Mediterranean or 
only part of it should be invited to join” (Mitterrand et al. 1993).
Defining who was to be part of this process and how the whole endeavour would be labelled 
became a border-drawing exercise with clear implications on how the EU was defining itself. 
Three different approaches coexisted. Yet, the dominant one was the “institutional vision”. 
It conceived of the Mediterranean as a group of countries with which the EU already had 
some level of cooperation in the framework of the existing Global Mediterranean Policy. The 
idea was to upgrade and complement what already existed. Until then, the limits of the Euro-
Mediterranean basin were not clearly defined. As noted by Michelle Pace (2002), the European 
Commission referred to the Mediterranean as a region of variable membership, at times only 
mentioning the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, then adding Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and 
Malta, sometimes including or removing Libya and Mauritania from the list, and even at times 
expanding it to cover Central and Eastern European countries. On the side of the EU Member 
States, the definition was not clear either. Interviewed officials clearly depicted different 
understandings of the Mediterranean by the United Kingdom, “who saw only the Middle East”, 
Spain, “who, in addition to the Maghreb, first focused on the Arab world but then adopted the 
Mediterranean narrative to include Israel”, and France, “who only focused on former colonies” 
(Interviewees 1 and 2).
The Barcelona Conference drew a fixed boundary of the Mediterranean by virtue of participation 
and membership in the EMP. Contrary to previous initiatives, the “official” Euro-Mediterranean 
region was to be formed, from 1995 onwards, by the EU Member States (15 at the time) and 
the 12 southern Mediterranean countries (eight of them Arab: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon and Syria; in addition to Israel, Turkey, Malta and 
Cyprus). Participation in Barcelona defined the “ins” and the “outs” of Euro-Mediterranean 
politics, with Libya being left out of the picture given the sanctions imposed by the UN and 
Mauritania considered part of the relations of the EU with ACP countries. Together with the 
Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union, these countries were invited as “special guests” 
(Philippart 2003: 202), although Libya refused to participate. The Balkans and Albania would 
also be left out. In addition to the instability in the former Yugoslavia, which precluded inclusion 
(Edis 1998: 95), they were perceived as more appropriately accommodated in the group of 
Central and Eastern European countries, qualifying neither as Mediterranean or as European 
(Pace 2002: 201).
One of the peculiarities of the discussion on the scope of the Mediterranean and its meaning 
is that it often implies a defining Europe’s limits and purpose. Although some of the Southern 
and Eastern Mediterranean countries were to become either members of the EU (Malta and 
Cyprus) or candidates (Turkey), compared to more ambitious projects such as PHARE and 
pre-accession strategies, cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries would never be 
based on their eventual membership in the EU (Barbé 1996, Attinà 2004). This idea became 
even more clear when official texts (from 1995 onwards) started to use the concept “Euro-
Mediterranean” as if this space from Finland to Algeria and from Morocco to Jordan was the 
juxtaposition of two separate entities (Europe and the Mediterranean).
Thus, it is particularly interesting to identify how different actors used (and reproduced) the 
categories of “us” and “them”. In the interviews conducted in the framework of the MEDRESET 
project, these terms were not used consistently. Even the same official could give them a 
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different meaning depending on the issue approached. “Us” was often used to designate the 
European Union members while “they” were the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. 
However, on some occasions “us” was used to refer to a group of like-minded countries and 
institutions and “they” were those to be convinced. Finally, the concept of “us” was used to refer 
to a group of individuals who shared a common vision, which was not restricted to officials and 
policy-makers but also included intellectuals, social activists and members of the research 
community, including also individuals from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries.
In Barcelona, partner countries also drew a line vis-à-vis external powers. The US expressed 
interest in the launch of the EMP, although it was never formally invited, due to the willingness 
to separate the fate of the EMP from the MEPP and the added pressure that the US involvement 
would put on Arab participants. In addition, US diplomats did not perceive the Mediterranean 
as a political subject or a geopolitical space but rather a “transit route” towards the Middle East 
(Interviewee 3). For similar reasons, NATO was never part of the equation. But all representatives 
who wanted to closely monitor the debates of the first Euro-Mediterranean conference were 
invited to a “diplomatic tribune”, where Central and Eastern European countries, Russia and 
the US, among others, sat (Barbé 1996: 34).
This “institutional vision” was partially resisted by a “geopolitical vision” which contested the 
perimeter of what the EU had considered the Mediterranean to be. Such was the case for the 
CSCM project, which covered a space from Mauritania and Portugal in the West to Iran to the 
East and also aimed at involving the US and Russia, thus including the Black Sea as part of a 
wider Mediterranean (Barbé 1991: 79). Yet, with this exemption, such a view was mainly voiced 
among academics and members of think-tanks; Roberto Aliboni (1991: 3) affirmed that, from 
a geopolitical perspective, the Mediterranean could not be limited to the coastal countries 
but should comprise parts of the Sahel and the Gulf countries. This statement reflects what 
nowadays the EU calls the “neighbours of the neighbours”. Other authors focused on the idea 
of a variable geometry approach, ranging from the three sub-regions of southern Europe, the 
Maghreb and the Mashreq (Calleya 1997), to inclusion of the Balkans (Tanner 1996) and even 
the Gulf of Arabia if strategic and energy considerations were reflected (Lorca 1996).
Finally, some voices advocated for an “activist vision”. The Mediterranean was presented as a 
project, as a call for action. A good example of this is Paul Balta’s (1992) proposal to reinvent 
the Mediterranean. From that perspective, the idea of who could be part of such a project 
was rather flexible. The Mediterranean was more an idea than a region. Those voices were 
active in the intellectual debate but had little influence in the policy cycle, at least during this 
embryonic period.
4. The EMP in Practice and Its Three Big Debates
In the mid-1990s, the seeds planted with previous initiatives materialized in the form of a proper 
cooperation framework between both shores of the Mediterranean. Several internal and 
external conditions facilitated the emergence of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, 
or the “Barcelona Process”) as a multidimensional, multilateral and regional framework for 
cooperation, mostly driven from Europe. The Barcelona Process emerged as a comprehensive 
framework of regional cooperation among the 15 EU Member States and the 12 southern 
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Mediterranean partners. Unlike the previous initiatives, the EMP aimed to establish a 
“comprehensive cooperation” structured on three baskets: a political and security partnership 
with the objective to establish a “common area of peace and stability”; an economic and 
financial partnership aimed at “an area of shared prosperity” and based on a free trade area, 
in place by 2010; and a social and cultural partnership to foster human development, better 
cultural understanding and civil society exchanges.
At the Barcelona Conference of 27-28 November 1995, and under the Spanish Presidency 
of the EU, the participants adopted an executive agreement made up of a Declaration and a 
Work Programme, both constituting the EMP. The Barcelona Declaration embodied a “spirit 
of openness and generosity enabling a climate of trust to be created in the region”, in the 
words of Javier Solana, then Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Solana 1995). This “Barcelona 
spirit” was built on the basis of the complementarity between the EMP and other relations that 
participating partners might have with the EU. The EMP was also accompanied by a flexible 
implementation programme, not formally institutionalized although represented in a two-
level structure: the “Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs” and the 
“Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process”, at a senior official level, which 
monitored the implementation of the Process (Attinà 2004, Philippart 2003).
The spirit of mutual trust among the Euro-Mediterranean partners survived at least until the 
following two meetings of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers, organized in Valletta 
(April 1997) and Stuttgart (April 1999). With the election of the new Israeli government headed 
by Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1996, the much-avoided “contamination” of the Barcelona 
Process by the MEPP became a reality. Arab partners refused to host ministerial meetings of 
the EMP given the reluctance of Netanyahu’s government to follow the commitments of Oslo, 
so prospects faded for having a review conference for Barcelona in Tunisia or Morocco.
With the feeling that the Barcelona Process was not “getting off the launching-pad” (Edis 1998: 
100), the Malta ministerial conference in May 1997 ended with a perceived feeling of failure. 
Participants were not able to agree on the draft conclusions until a month later, which signals 
how the increasingly turbulent regional relations had hijacked the EMP and its capacity to 
move forward. The first failure to endorse a security Charter for peace and stability in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region as a way to promote peaceful conflict resolution signals the lack 
of progress in Malta (Calleya 1997).
The ad hoc ministerial meeting in Palermo of 3-4 June 1998 paved the way for more in-depth 
discussions on the economic, financial and cultural baskets, which had been left aside as 
a consequence of the Valetta failure. A “spirit of Palermo” (Edis 1998: 102) facilitated more 
constructive discussions in the third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs in Stuttgart in April 1999, where all members “reaffirmed their resolve to take forward 
the Partnership into the new millennium” (Council of the European Union 1999). But as the 
next section will reveal, the opposite occurred. Stuttgart became the “turning point” between 
the euphoria of 1995-1998 and a phase of frustration (Interviewee 3). From then onwards, the 
Mediterranean would be characterized by the “mediatization” of conflicts among the partners, 
which would prevent any kind of dialogue beyond economic cooperation (Aubarell 1999: 78).
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During its golden years, albeit with ebbs and flows, the Barcelona Process moved from 
ontological discussions about the purpose of the project to debates about how to operationalize 
it. The first such debate focused on the co-ownership of the process versus a patronizing 
approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations, often on the basis of security interests. The second 
debate was between a comprehensive agenda and an economic-driven partnership, based 
on the interests of northern participants. And finally, there was a debate between a multilateral 
and a bilateral approach to the region.
The first debate put forward by the Barcelona Process was between the ideas of co-ownership 
and patronizing relations, on the basis of the North’s security interests. Most voices in the 
policy-making and epistemic communities put forward the idea that the EMP was built on the 
basis of co-ownership, bringing together countries from both shores of the Mediterranean 
under a single framework. The preparatory work of the Barcelona Conference was meant to 
increase the sense of ownership of the EMP. As one of the officials interviewed recalls, the run-
up to Barcelona was characterized by several meetings in Brussels and the different southern 
capitals between officials and other stakeholders to “conceptualize a new framework for the 
Mediterranean” (Interviewee 1).
In the Conference, the adhesion to the principles embodied in the Declaration – based on the 
respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and economic development – signalled 
the partnership ambition of the “spirit of Barcelona”. Political dialogue, also among Arabs and 
Israelis “even if they did not talk to each other” (Interviewee 1), was meant to institutionalize 
the contacts between participants on the basis of co-ownership and under a shared umbrella. 
As the Declaration famously put it, the Barcelona Process was aimed at creating “an area 
of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” (Euro-
Mediterranean Conference 1995: 2). However, it can also be argued that by separating the EMP 
from the Middle East Peace Process (Khader 2015: 43), the Barcelona Process contributed to 
the depoliticization of the conflict. If, as stated by one of the officials interviewed (Interviewee 
1), Arab and Israeli officials sat around the same table during Euro-Mediterranean conferences 
but preferred not to address each other, the EMP contributed to depoliticizing rather than 
fostering political dialogue on the conflict.
Contrary to the overall objective to create an area of shared peace and stability, many observers 
criticized the formalization of an excessively security-based approach to Euro-Mediterranean 
relations, thus leading to the securitization of the overall process. Through European lenses, 
Mediterranean partners were considered as a source of insecurity given the instability 
of the region, the flow of immigrants, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons and Islamic 
fundamentalism (Biad 1997). No wonder that the major “stumbling block” of the Barcelona 
Declaration became the division over its first section on the political and security partnership 
(Barbé 1996: 38), where Northern and Southern participants were divided on the issues of 
terrorism, de-nuclearization and migration (Interviewees 1 and 7). Quite often divisions could 
be found among Southern partners themselves. As one of the officials interviewed recalls, Arab 
countries supported the right of “resistance” of Palestine, Israel did not want to include any 
reference to the de-nuclearization of the region and migration was not considered a “burning” 
issue in the agenda, so it could be dealt with separately and at a later stage (Interviewee 1).
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In contrast, on migration, the division among Northern and Southern Mediterranean partners 
became evident with the reluctance of the former to include the free circulation of persons in 
the Barcelona Declaration, given the perceived, although not officially expressed, link between 
immigration and insecurity (Interviewee 1 and 6). The securitization of the Euro-Mediterranean 
agenda became clear when observers of the Barcelona Process started to witness a tendency 
to promote “order” and “stability” instead of democratic reform (Khader 2015: 48). One of the 
officials interviewed went so far as to say that the Barcelona Process “was about the security 
of Europe, not an altruistic gesture” (Interviewee 4).
Other voices also criticized the EMP for providing a “post-colonial reading of the ‘region’” 
(Pace 2002: 202), where European partners considered themselves as superior to Southern 
participants. The contents of the Barcelona Declaration were criticized for representing an 
import of Western values, a narrative that permeated some of the debates of the Alternative 
Mediterranean Conference, held in Barcelona on 24-28 November 1995 (Conferència 
Mediterrània Alternativa 1996). In this conference, several references were made to the 
Mediterranean as the “new iron curtain” between the developed North, “holder of the global 
hegemony”, and an exploited “South”, a “new enemy as a substitute of the former communist 
enemy: Muslim countries, Islam and, more specifically, political Islam”. In this context, the 
Mediterranean becomes a “framework of global confrontation” (Conferència Mediterrània 
Alternativa 1996: 15-16). In this conference, alternative proposals were put forward, such as the 
end of a “patronizing” notion of cooperation, access to agricultural markets, co-development 
instruments, social measures to tackle unemployment, debt release, de-securitization of the 
relations with the Mediterranean and its perception as a threat, demilitarization of the security 
dimension, etc. (Conferència Mediterrània Alternativa 1996: 31-44).
All in all, these voices argued that, in the framework of the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean 
was not read under the premises of a shared “mare nostrum” and the “cradle of civilisation” 
but as a “frontier” (Nair 1997: 258, Morin 1999), dangerously falling into the narrative of Islam 
as the new enemy à la Huntington (1993). Some officials echoed this vision. In a session of 
the Spanish Congress, a member – Joaquim Molins i Amat – noted: “we must underline the 
importance of the situation in the Mediterranean for the security of Europe, once other threats 
have disappeared, ranging from underdevelopment to Islamic fundamentalism in the North 
of Africa” (Spanish Congress of Deputies 1997: 4932, emphasis added). Similar ideas were 
expressed at the Italian Congress. For instance, MP Stefano Morselli identified the outbreak 
of terrorism and fundamentalism in the region as sources of insecurity (Italian Chamber of 
Deputies 1995: 566). In addition to a securitization discourse, this reveals a mounting sense of 
“otherness” vis-à-vis Southern Mediterranean partners, undermining the partnership and co-
ownership narrative embodied in the Barcelona Process.
The second debate confronted a comprehensive vision of the EMP versus those who saw it as 
an economy-driven process. Contrary to the previous sectorial initiatives for the Mediterranean, 
the EMP was supposed to establish a comprehensive agenda for Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. The three baskets (politics and security; economy and finance; and cultural and civil 
society relations) were complementary to each other and were to be negotiated together. 
According to one of the officials interviewed, the novelty and success of the EMP was due to 
the methodological innovation introduced by the inter-linkages between multiple negotiation 
files. Failure to agree on a set of measures in one of the baskets would mean the failure of the 
overall Process (Interviewee 5). This method provided as well for a substantial innovation in the 
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results, which combined social, economic, political and security objectives in a multidimensional 
manner (Barbé 1996). As Philippart noted, the benefit of the Process came from the fact that 
“[n]arrowing down the EMP scope would then necessarily mean alienating one of the parties” 
(Philippart 2003: 206).
Against the multidimensional logic of the EMP, others have argued that the focus since 
Barcelona has been chiefly economic. Of the three baskets of the Barcelona Declaration, 
the second, economy and finance, was the most developed, leading to a technocratization 
of Euro-Mediterranean relations.9 Specific measures were put forward, including substantial 
aid commitments, the channelling of loans through the European Investment Bank and the 
Free Trade Area for 2010. Following the logic of the “theory of markets as a democratizing 
force” (Kienle 1998: 4), the departing premise was that economic development and free trade 
would create political dividends and transform Arab societies (with the emergence of a strong 
middle class), which would result in political reform and which, in turn, would facilitate conflict 
resolution in the region. Economic reforms and partnership, defined as the “engine” of the 
Barcelona Process (Edis 1998: 97), would enable Southern Mediterranean countries to foster a 
“causal chain of developments” by which economic cooperation would lead to prosperity and 
political reforms (Interviewee 3).10
However, the logic did not come free of criticism. Dealing with autocratic regimes in a 
business-like style facilitated the consolidation of their power, thus technocratizing the newly 
established framework of cooperation. In addition, the adoption of liberal policies clashed 
with the reality of imbalances between Northern and Southern Mediterranean economies, 
characterized by low levels of intra-South trade, a high dependence of Southern economies on 
their Northern counterparts (with a large trade surplus for the latter) and an “asymmetrical trade 
interdependence” (Bacaria and Tovias 1999a: 7, 1999b: 16). The neoliberal recipe for economic 
reform and the reliance on structurally unequal North-South relations was strongly criticized 
in the framework of the Alternative Mediterranean Conference (Conferència Mediterrània 
Alternativa 1996). Observers of the Barcelona Process such as Sami Nair argued that good 
“sentiments” masked “well-intended interests” (Nair 1998: 207). The unwillingness of European 
partners to open their markets to Southern agricultural products was often mentioned as a 
relevant case in point.
Criticism of the reliance on economic strategies for political purposes (Kienle 1998: 3) also 
included a warning sign from the participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum, which 
gathered over 1,200 Northern and Southern civil society representatives in Barcelona a 
week after the official Conference. The Euro-Med Civil Forum (Fòrum Civil Euromed 1995) 
was considered a remarkable innovation of the Barcelona Process, since it put emphasis on 
the cooperation between civil societies alongside the official gatherings (Attinà 2004: 144).11 
9	 Particularly	when	compared	to	the	vague	language	of	the	political	and	security	chapter,	the	most	controversial	
one,	as	previously	noted.
10	 This	causal	chain	was	acknowledged	by	the	European	Commission	when	preparing	the	Barcelona	Process.	It	
affirmed	that	in	order	to	achieve	the	EMP	goals	it	would	“start	with	a	process	of	progressive	establishment	of	free	
trade,	supported	by	substantial	financial	aid”	(European	Commission	1994:	2,	emphasis	added).
11	 Another	sign	of	interest	in	the	development	of	a	Euro-Mediterranean	civil	society	was	the	set-up	of	the	Euro-
Mediterranean	Study	Commission	(EuroMeSCo),	a	research	network	on	politics	and	security	in	the	Mediterranean	
which	was	launched	in	Sesimbra	(Portugal)	in	June	1996	(www.euromesco.net).	For	the	socio-economic	dimension,	
a	similar	network	of	studies	was	launched	in	1997,	the	Forum	Euroméditerranéen	des	Instituts	de	Sciences	
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The Forum met in the margins of the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences, so it was also held 
in Valletta (11-13 April 1997), Naples (12-14 December 1997) and Stuttgart (13-17 April 1999).12 
Participants however warned against the insufficient efforts in promoting the human and social 
provisions of the Barcelona Declaration, which they criticized for excessively relying on its 
economic dimension and for being too state-driven.
The final debate that emerged from the set-up of the Barcelona Process was between the 
proponents of a multilateral track for regional relations against traditional bilateral policies. 
The EMP was conceived as a multilateral platform for confidence building, although it did not 
prevent partners from developing bilateral relations. An official interviewed called Barcelona a 
process based on “multi-bilateral relations” (Interviewee 1). Indeed, for Southern Mediterranean 
partners, the EMP was no substitute of their bilateral ties with the EU, as reflected by the 
parallel existence of Association Agreements (at that moment Tunisia, Israel and Morocco had 
already signed such agreements), nor of the prospect of enlargement of the EU towards the 
south (as reflected by the later accession of Malta and Cyprus) (Barbé 1996: 37).
Securing a fair balance between multilateralism and bilateralism was of importance for several 
reasons. First, countries such as Egypt did not want to be left out of the Process even if they 
lacked the strong links with the EU that an Association Agreement provides, so a multilateral 
framework was useful. Second, “multi-bilateralism” did not prevent policy-entrepreneurs 
from the European side from pursuing deeper relations with either former colonies or close 
Southern Mediterranean partners such as Morocco, as was the case for France and Spain. This 
also facilitated the “Europeanization” of bilateral relations via a common Euro-Mediterranean 
umbrella (Interviewees 2 and 3). Thirdly, a country like Germany, whose political focus was 
on Central and Eastern Europe, was able to influence a multilateral process via a strong 
involvement in the financial aspects.
In this regard, the understanding and sharing of responsibilities between key personalities such 
as Felipe González and Helmut Kohl is usually considered to have facilitated the agreement 
on the EU side for the launch of the EMP (Barbé 1996). The Presidencies of the Council of the 
EU in Greece, Germany, France and Spain (particularly these two) and Italy from 1994 to 1996 
– thus dominated by Southern EU states – made possible progress in European Councils such 
as Corfu, Essen and Cannes, previous to the Barcelona Conference.13 The impetus from the 
Council was reinforced with the position of the Spaniard Manuel Marín as Vice-President of the 
Commission, who was also part of a powerful leadership constellation during the golden years 
of the EMP (Interviewees 1 and 5).
Overall, the narratives and debates of the golden years of the Barcelona Process served to 
establish a new method of cooperation between the Southern and Northern partners of the 
Mediterranean. 1995 can be considered a signpost of the set-up of a multilateral, regional and 
Économiques	(FEMISE,	www.femise.org).
12	 For	a	summary	of	the	discussions	in	each	Forum,	see	Aubarell	(1999:	70-72).
13	 Some	observers	link	the	faltering	of	the	Process	from	Stuttgart	(15-16	April	1999)	onwards	to	the	diminished	
interest	of	EU	Council	Presidencies	of	northern	EU	members	such	as	Netherlands,	Luxembourg,	UK	or	Austria	(see	
for	instance	Edis	1998:	101,	Barbé	1996,	and	Bicchi	2007:	Ch.	5	for	a	broader	perspective).	An	official	interviewed	
went	so	far	as	to	say	that	the	fading	of	the	Barcelona	Process	was	due	to	a	European	“retreat”	and	even	
“abandonment”	(Interviewee	3).
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multidimensional partnership that, not without problems, has been the building block of Euro-
Mediterranean relations to date.
5. The Early 2000s: A Re-Securitized Approach
The Mediterranean has been framed as a current or potential threat since the early 1990s. 
Thus, the region (as a whole) and particular issues (mainly migration, religion and demography) 
were systematically securitized. This became even stronger during the early 2000s.
In 2000 the EU adopted a Common Mediterranean Strategy. One of the aims of this exercise 
was to increase the EU policy coherence (Spencer 2001). The document also acknowledged 
the need for “reinvigorating” the Barcelona Process and making it “more action oriented and 
results-driven” (European Council 2000: 6). In this text the Mediterranean is depicted as a 
region of “vital importance” whose stability and prosperity are in “the best interests of the 
EU and Europe as a whole” and which faces many challenges (political, economic, judicial, 
ecological and social) that “are to be overcome” (European Council 2000: 5, emphasis added). 
It is symptomatic that the heading given to the introductory sections of this strategy was a 
“Vision of the EU for the Mediterranean region” (Ibid.). The choice of words suggests a rather 
patronizing and unilateral approach to this particular part of the world which is far away from 
the partnership philosophy of the Barcelona Process. This is also a vision that does not consider 
the EU (and the threats and challenges emanating from it) as part of the Mediterranean. Once 
more, Europe is portrayed as a problem-solver and the region as a problem-incubator.
Taking into account that many of the texts adopted in the previous period were negotiated 
to a large extent with Mediterranean partners, analysing this specific document is a good 
testimony to the EU’s distinct priorities and perceptions in that very moment. For instance, it is 
interesting to note that references to democracy (four times) and human rights (ten times) are 
more abundant than in the commonly agreed texts. It is also worth mentioning the prominence 
given to migration issues and the fact that this was no longer tackled as an issue pertaining to 
the cultural and human basket but rather as a justice and home affairs one. This contributed, 
albeit by osmosis (regular migration under the same heading as smuggling and drug trafficking), 
to the full securitization of the migration agenda.
Right after the approval of the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean, the MEPP collapsed. 
The lack of progress since the assassination of Rabin and specifically since the election of 
Netanyahu had already undermined attempts to upgrade the political and security basket of 
the EU. However, senior officials and members of the research community (particularly those 
integrated in the EuroMeSCo network) worked persistently on the project of adopting a Euro-
Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. The Charter was a non-binding document that, 
among others, would have set the principles for how to address conflict escalation through a 
reinforced political dialogue and would have promoted partnership-building initiatives. That is, 
it would have rebalanced the depoliticized approach of the Barcelona Process agenda.
France pushed for the adoption of this document during its EU Council presidency in the 
second half of 2000 (Védrine 2000). Yet, the outbreak of the second intifada in September 
2000 made this impossible. Two countries, Syria and Lebanon, decided not to attend the 
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Marseille Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and, in the words of 
a European diplomat, “everyone realized that they had been too ambitious and there was no 
other option but to put the Charter in the freezer, hoping that one day it would be possible to 
give it a new life” (Interviewee 8). The Arab-Israeli conflict became not only a threat for the 
citizens of Palestine, Israel and the neighbouring countries but also a menace to the Barcelona 
Process.
Muriel Asseburg (2003) considered the situation in the Middle East as the “main obstacle” to 
the EMP. Jean-François Daguzan (2000) wondered whether this was “the end of the illusions”. 
The deterioration of the situation in Palestine contributed to frustrating those in the academic 
community who had looked at the EMP as a promising instrument and considered that 
security building in the Mediterranean was supported “by relevant favourable conditions for 
multilateral security institutions” (Attinà 2001). As for the officials interviewed, one described 
it as “the catalyst of a Mediterranean frustration” (Interviewee 4) and another as a “test of the 
resilience of the initiative” (Interviewee 1).
A few months later the world was shaken by the September 11 attacks. The EMP was not 
immune to the reverberations. The most visible effect was that terrorism was back in the 
Euro-Mediterranean agenda. But the impact was broader. As argued by Annette Jünemann 
(2004: 17), this “had the effect of Europeans solving the ‘democratization-stabilization dilemma’ 
increasingly in favour of the latter”. It also gave political and security arguments to those 
advocating for the strengthening of the third basket (cultural and human exchanges) of the 
Barcelona Process. For instance, it is precisely in this context that the idea emerged of creating 
a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote a dialogue of cultures. This was the embryo for 
what was to become the Anna Lindh Foundation. According to Stephan Calleya (2005: 106), 
“the post-9/11 international climate seems much more conducive to providing the political will 
necessary to see such an ambitious undertaking”.
In face of such shocks, actors who once had been policy-entrepreneurs became policy-
defenders. Important segments of the policy and research community that had a strong 
attachment to the Barcelona Process mobilized to preserve and justify its very existence, 
and to a great extent they succeeded. In fact, the Action Plan of Valencia, approved in 2002, 
affirmed that “[t]he Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the 
participants to be able to engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual concern” (Council 
of the European Union 2002: 5).
During this period the discussion on the geographical scope of Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation was not completely settled. The launching of the Barcelona Process contributed 
to consolidating the concept of “Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries” (SEMC) 
and drew a bureaucratic line between those who were in and those who had an associate or 
invited status (Mauritania, Libya) or were deliberately excluded (the Gulf countries, Iraq and 
Iran), thus reinforcing the institutional vision. However, the geopolitical vision, although not 
hegemonic, became more prominent. The Mediterranean was increasingly perceived as being 
part of a broader system of concentric circles. For instance, Romano Prodi, then President of 
the European Commission, stated that “the Mediterranean in all its diversity [is seen] as a girdle 
of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region stretching 
from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf” (Prodi 2002: 3). It was also in this period 
that Javier Solana and Chris Patten signed a letter entitled “Wider Europe” that is seen as the 
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seminal document of what was to become the European Neighbourhood Policy (Patten and 
Solana 2002).
Policy-makers and academics also reflected upon a “fragmented Mediterranean”. The then 
Spanish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs argued that “we should speak candidly and say, 
that regrettably, the Mediterranean is still a sea that divides rather than a sea that integrates. 
It’s a sea of division in many respects: regarding the political systems, regarding the economic 
situation and also regarding the little integration among different societies” (Spanish Congress 
of Deputies, 2002: 14444, emphasis added). The breach between Europe and the Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean countries was perceived as increasingly problematic and, as this quote 
reflects, the EU portrayed itself as an actor that would try to bridge this gap.
Think-tanks and members of the research community reproduced the idea that the 
Mediterranean was not a unity but the meeting place between two or more distinct 
complexes. In social economic terms the region was seen as divided between a prosperous 
but aging “North” and a poorer and demographically buoyant “South”. This is what Rémy 
Leveau (2002: 1031) described as “the Mediterranean of the rich and the Mediterranean of the 
poor”. In geopolitical terms, the Mediterranean was portrayed as a complex containing four 
differentiated sub-regions: Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb and Mashreq (Sánchez 
Mateos 2002: 8).
In this period we observe the emergence of a new narrative: the Mediterranean as a European 
test. Both the realization of regional fragmentation but, above all, the degradation of security 
conditions fed that particular narrative. The then French Minister for Foreign Affairs Hubert 
Védrine (2000: 166) linked the Mediterranean dimension of the EU with its “willingness to be 
seen as a global player”.
While the collapse of the MEPP had a demobilizing effect, the September 11 attacks were 
portrayed as a reminder that the EU had to put more attention towards its Mediterranean 
neighbours and had to revise its agenda of priorities. Those attacks “increased the need for 
more stability in the South in order to obtain more stability and broad security in Europe and 
the West”, said Roberto Aliboni (2002: 108). He added that “an agenda limited to the extension 
of economic aid and cooperation cannot be sufficient”. The former Spanish Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, in a parliamentary debate, also argued that “in light of September 11, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership had become more 
important and necessary than ever before” (Spanish Congress of Deputies 2002: 14444).
Following that rationale, the Spanish EU Council Presidency (first half of 2002) worked together 
with the Commission to revitalize the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and diversify its agenda 
(Soler i Lecha and Weltner-Puig 2002). Although tension was still high in the Middle East, they 
managed to approve a five-year Action Plan in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Valencia 
and also the endorsement of a general framework leading to a Euro-Mediterranean regional 
programme on freedom, justice and governance, which had a strong focus on migration and 
organized crime. Terrorism was also part of the agenda but in Valencia it became impossible 
to adopt specific measures as partners could not agree on a common definition of terrorism.
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Migration figured prominently, and a fourth basket on Justice and Home Affairs was added to 
the classical tripartite scheme of the Barcelona Process (Gillespie 2003, Wolff 2012). The links 
between migration, terrorism and criminality were frequent, albeit indirect. That is, documents 
did not establish a link between the phenomena, but treating them under the same heading 
reinforced a securitized approach to migration. Academic debates reflected this momentum. 
Roberto Aliboni (2002: 104) argued that after 11 September and with increasing migration, 
“Europe’s proximity to North Africa and the Middle East, previously neutral in its effects, now 
has an impact on Western security and requires policies suited to manage such proximity.”
In this period we observe a new prominence of the cultural agenda, although from an 
increasingly securitized approach (Jünemann 2003, Malmvig 2005). Political statements 
confirm the securitization of the third basket of the Barcelona Process. That is, cooperation in 
this field was not perceived and promoted as a goal in itself but rather as a way to counter the 
terrorist threat. For instance, Peter Hain, then UK’s minister for Europe, stated that “the events 
of 11 September have meant that greater consideration should be given to the region’s security 
and to mutual respect in the region for the cultures and civilisations contained within it” (UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002). Similarly, the then Spanish premier José María Aznar, 
in a joint conference with Abdelaziz Bouteflika mentioned that the attacks of September 11, 
with such devastating effects, have fostered a spirit of understanding and cooperation among 
different countries, which, far from being confronted with any clash of civilizations, feel the 
need to intensify efforts in favour of dialogue between cultures and civilizations and against a 
common adversary, a common enemy, terrorism (Aznar and Bouteflika 2002).
In fact, one of the most revealing elements of this period is that, after September 11, the concept 
of “civilization” was used extensively in most political and official texts. Previous formulations 
referred to the challenge of “mutual understanding among the peoples of the region”.14 This 
terminological shift reveals that the broader discussion on the risk of a “clash of civilizations” as 
presented by Samuel Huntington (1993) had entered the Euro-Mediterranean debate. In fact, 
one diplomat dealing with the Mediterranean dossier in 2002 argued that “the raison d’être 
of the Barcelona Process was [precisely] to show that Huntington and those who bought his 
ideas were wrong” (Interviewee 4).
The terminology used in the Action Programme for the Dialogue between Cultures and 
Civilisations approved in 2002 is indicative of this discursive shift, while also being a marker 
of othering and boundary-drawing. In this text, adopted by Euro-Mediterranean ministers, it is 
said that that “[t]he ultimate goal of dialogue should not be to change ‘the other’ but, rather, to 
coexist peacefully with the other” (European Commission 2002: 1).
The new centrality of security, migration and “civilizational” debates was not at the expense of 
the traditional EU focus on trade and financial issues. In almost all speeches and official texts, 
the idea of achieving an area of “shared prosperity” was listed as one of the three main goals 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and there was a boost to the financial instruments 
through the creation of a reinforced investment facility within the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) to promote infrastructure and private sector investment. In fact, it can be argued that 
14	 In	that	sense,	it	is	useful	to	compare	the	terminology	of	the	Presidency	Conclusions	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	
Conference	of	Marseille	in	2000	with	those	of	the	Valencia	Conference	in	2002.
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security was used as an argument to demand more involvement and support in fields that 
were not previously securitized.
For instance, in the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean adopted in 2000 it is said that 
the EU will “promote transparency and greater predictability of legal systems in the partners 
in order to encourage foreign investment, and to encourage lawful migrants to pursue 
activities in favour of co-development with their countries of origin” (European Council 2000: 
8). This reference is to be found under the heading of Justice and Home Affairs, and reflects 
a securitization process of fields such as investment or development. Greater convergence 
on the security agenda with third countries also gave a boost to other areas where there had 
been problems in cooperating. A case in point is Algeria, a country that had been reluctant to 
further trade liberalization but that signed an association agreement with the EU in 2002 that 
included provisions on the fight against terrorism.
This evolution was resisted by some highly mobilized actors. Civil society organizations, 
individually or as part of different networks, contested a securitized and technocratic approach 
to Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is worth recalling that this period corresponds with the 
emergence of the anti-globalization movement and massive protests in Seattle in 1999 and in 
Genoa in 2001. Thus, the emergence of a Mediterranean civil society was somehow linked to 
the discussion on the existence of a “global civil society” (Feliu 2005). Human rights networks 
created in the late 1990s were also gaining traction (Van Hüllen 2009). In light of September 
11, activists were asking to re-launch the Barcelona Process through “a new social contract 
for peace and justice in the region” and called for a “more Mediterranean and less atlanticist 
Europe” (Ravenel 2002: 210). Vocal academics like Jean-Robert Henry (2002) aspired to be as 
ambitious as possible and referred to this project as a much “needed utopia”.
Gradually, for governmental actors it became strategic to channel those voices into more 
institutional frameworks, as was attempted with the Civil Forum of Valencia (Soler i Lecha 2003). 
As a result, in this period the third basket became more prominent and yet, the approach and 
the practices were systematically criticized. Antoni Segura (2001: 6), for instance, argued that 
the contents of that basket resembled a catalogue of good intentions aimed at correcting the 
undesired effects of economic liberalization. Annette Jünemann (2002: 96) considered that the 
Civil Forum was “too far away from the decision-making process to be effective in influencing 
EMP policies, but too exposed to the political influence of the member states hosting its 
meetings to fulfil an external, critical ‘watchdog function’”.
In fact, activist groups would continue to criticize the liberal approach embedded in the 
association agreements or the violation of human rights in the region, but Brussels and the 
Member States realized that it was better to engage in a dialogue rather than confronting in 
the streets (Soler i Lecha 2003). Thus, different initiatives tried to expand the “social basis” of 
the Barcelona Process: the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum became a permanent interface 
with the civil society. In Valencia, the partners agreed to transform a previously existing 
Parliamentary Forum into a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (Montoya and Chikhi 
2009). Similarly, local and regional authorities regularly pushed for the creation of a permanent 
structure for local and regional authorities (Committee of the Regions 2001).
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This was a period in which everyone (governments, European institutions but also civil society 
organizations) faced dilemmas and contradictions that are still alive today. Critical voices 
were heard but barely anybody contested the need to promote a stronger partnership in the 
Mediterranean. A Spanish diplomat, Pedro López Aguirrebengoa (2000: 260), summarized this 
situation in saying that “despite all the challenges the Barcelona Process was still the best 
option available”.
Conclusions
With the end of the Cold War, several policy-entrepreneurs put forward varying narratives 
on why to invest in the Mediterranean. This region was presented as a source of threat, 
but engagement was also seen as necessary due to proximity and interdependence. The 
Mediterranean was viewed as both an opportunity and a responsibility, in light of Europe’s 
growing ambition in international affairs. Once Europeans agreed that the EMP was worth 
“investing” in, a series of debates emerged on how to do this. These revolved around drawing 
the boundaries of the Mediterranean, patronalization versus co-ownership, and a technocratic 
versus a comprehensive approach. However, this fragile architecture was confronted with two 
shocks beyond Europe’s control: the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process and the 9/11 
attacks. This was a litmus test not only for the EMP but for the EU as a whole.
This research has scrutinized the extent to which securitization, (de)politicization and 
technocratization processes were present when the EU actively worked to build a Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. Through this engagement the EU tried to reaffirm its willingness 
to become a political player and gradually emphasized its identity as a transformative actor. 
What was initially incepted as a political project was nevertheless implemented in a rather 
depoliticized and technocratic way.
Securitization processes had been present since the beginning, with Europe being presented 
as a solution to threats emanating from the South. After 9/11, the securitization processes 
became more apparent, particularly when dealing with migration and relations with Islam.
Those ideas were translated into policy instruments. The early days of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations experimented with a series of initiatives promoted by like-minded states and, even 
more, like-minded individuals. The Barcelona Process culminated those efforts by offering 
a comprehensive cooperation framework based on the link between trade liberalization 
and political transformations, reinforcing a technocratic approach to regional challenges. 
Facing growing criticism by social activists, the EMP attempted to increase its social support 
by reaching out to parliamentarians, local authorities and civil society organizations. The 
instruments put forward in the foundational period of Euro-Mediterranean relations have 
contributed to solidifying an understanding of the region that holds to this day.
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